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Abstract
There is evidence that competing ¯rms delegate R&D to the same independent pro¯t-maximizing
laboratory. We draw on this stylized fact to construct a model where two ¯rms in the same industry
o®er transfer payments in exchange of user-speci¯c R&D services from a common laboratory. Inter-
¯rm and within-laboratory externalities a®ect the intensity of competition among delegating ¯rms on
the intermediate market for technology. Whether competition is relatively soft or tight is re°ected
by each ¯rm's transfer payment o®ers to the laboratory. This in turn determines the laboratory's
capacity to earn pro¯ts, R&D outcomes, delegating ¯rms' pro¯ts, and social welfare. We compare the
delegated R&D game to two other ones where ¯rms (i) cooperatively conduct in-house R&D, and (ii)
non-cooperatively choose in-house R&D. The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two
games, and the laboratory earns positive pro¯ts, only if within-laboratory R&D services are su±ciently
complementary, but inter-¯rm spillovers are su±ciently low. We ¯nd no room for policy intervention,
because the privately pro¯table decision to delegate R&D, when the laboratory participates, always
bene¯ts consumers.
JEL Classi¯cation: C72; L13; O31.
Keywords: Research and Development, Externalities, Common agency.1 Introduction
There are many examples of ¯rms delegating (i.e. outsourcing) R&D to for-pro¯t laboratories, and this
is a growing phenomenon: contracted-out R&D in the United States increased from approximately $6
billion in 1997 to $15 billion in 2000 (National Science Foundation 2003).1 More surprising is the fact
that rival ¯rms often delegate their R&D to a common independent laboratory. For example, Bayer and
ICI (two European ¯rms in the chemical industry which compete on world markets) signed multi-year
contracts in 1999 and 2000 respectively with Symyx, a U.S.-based private laboratory. Symyx receives
payments by providing access to a proprietary technology for the production of high-value specialty
polymers. Similarly, ThyssenKrupp and Arcelor (two major European steel suppliers), contracted in
1995 with VAI, a laboratory which specializes in the design of new steel production methods. The R&D
services received from VAI aim at producing wide thin strips of stainless and carbon steel directly from
the molten metal, omitting the stages of slab casting and rolling.
Delegated R&D contracts typically specify the required R&D outcome in exchange of a payment
scheme with detailed non-compete clauses or exclusivity conditions.2 For example, such clauses appear
in a contract signed in 1997 by Millennium (a U.S.-based private laboratory in the biotechnology
sector) and Monsanto (a US provider of agricultural products) for gene-sequencing R&D services.
In this contract, Millennium agrees not to share the bene¯ts of this collaboration with any other
agricultural enterprise without the prior written consent of Monsanto. Another example is a 1998
contract between the same laboratory and a pharmaceutical division of Bayer for the provision of
molecules using genomics technology. The contract stipulates that the ¯rm may not bene¯t from the
outcomes of past collaborative research agreements between the laboratory and explicitly identi¯ed
competitors, including Ho®mann-La Roche, Eli Lilly, and P¯zer.3
We draw from these stylized facts to construct a game where ¯rms may delegate R&D to an
independent laboratory, or conduct in-house R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively. We allow ¯rm-
1speci¯c R&D services to be either complements, substitutes, or independent inside the laboratory's
R&D cost function. We (i) ask when the laboratory earns positive pro¯ts, (ii) compare R&D outcomes,
¯rms' pro¯ts, and social welfare in a delegated game with those in cooperative and non-cooperative
in-house R&D games, and (iii) derive conditions for R&D delegation to Pareto-dominate cooperative
and non-cooperative R&D.
While we know of no theoretical model of R&D delegation to a common laboratory, even though such
contracts are common, there is an extensive literature on the supply of technology licenses and in-house
R&D. The literature on licenses typically considers a monopolistic laboratory which sells a patented
process innovation to vertically-related ¯rms by making take-it-or-leave-it o®ers to downstream ¯rms.
Most analysis build on Katz and Shapiro's (1986) complete information model where the laboratory
incurs no cost (i.e., R&D costs have been paid in a previous period), and each downstream ¯rm is a
potential user of one unit of the innovative input.4 These analysis base an inventor's ability to earn
bene¯ts on the strategic interaction among potential licensees.
The in-house R&D literature pays particular attention to how technological spillovers a®ect R&D
outcomes, ¯rms' pro¯ts, and social welfare, when ¯rms may choose R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively.
In their seminal analysis, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) consider duopolistic ¯rms which invest
in deterministic cost-reducing R&D. They show that cooperation is R&D augmenting and welfare im-
proving when between-¯rm technological spillovers are su±ciently high. The numerous extensions to
their model assume in-house R&D, either in each ¯rm's separate laboratory or in a jointly owned one,
with ¯rms sharing the operating costs.5 Amir, Evstigneev and Wooders (2003) unify and generalize
the results of this literature without relying on speci¯c functional forms. They con¯rm two central
results of this research stream: (i) R&D cooperation increases ¯rms' pro¯ts; and (ii) the pro¯tability
of R&D cooperation increases with the level of R&D spillovers.6
2As in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we set up a model where two ¯rms behave µ a la Cournot
on a ¯nal market and bene¯t from cost-reducing R&D outputs. We build on this benchmark framework
by giving ¯rms the option to delegate R&D non-cooperatively to an independent laboratory. As in
Katz and Shapiro (1986), the laboratory is a pro¯t-maximizer, and may serve none, one, or two ¯rms.
However, we abandon their assumption that the laboratory is in a monopolistic position inherited from
past innovative e®orts. Rather, we assume the laboratory responds to payment schemes by providing
¯rm-speci¯c R&D services at some costs.7 This assumption captures situations where a laboratory
derives income from tailor-made R&D which it provides to ¯rms.
We consider that R&D generates two externalities: (i) the usual between-¯rm cost-reducing tech-
nological spillovers, and (ii) positive or negative within-laboratory externalities depending on whether
R&D services are complements or substitutes. We refer to the ¯rst externalities as direct externalities
and to the second as indirect ones. We allow ¯rm-speci¯c R&D services to be either complements or
substitutes in the laboratory, i.e. indirect externalities can be positive or negative respectively.8 We
use the natural ability of a common agency framework to capture the antagonistic action of two forces:
(i) the congruent objectives of the two users to share the resources of the same laboratory so as to
bene¯t from economies of scale or scope, and (ii) the competing attempts by the same ¯rms to drive
the production of R&D services towards tailor-made outcomes. This allows us to isolate the e®ect of
harmonized or con°icting requirements by R&D users, as a function of direct and indirect externalities,
on the ability of the laboratory to earn bene¯ts.
We establish a number of interesting and novel results. While one could expect the laboratory to
always earn positive bene¯ts when R&D services demanded by the ¯rms are complements, we prove
this is not the case. We ¯nd that the laboratory earns positive bene¯ts only if the ¯rm-speci¯c R&D
services it produces are substitutable, or not too complementary, and inter-¯rm spillovers are su±ciently
low. Intuitively, the ability of the laboratory to earn positive bene¯ts depends on the degree of rivalry
between the two ¯rms for its services. This rivalry is a function of the degree of complementarity or
3substitutability of the research projects inside the laboratory (indirect externalities), and of spillovers
(direct externalities). Whether competition for the laboratory's services is soft or tight is re°ected by
each ¯rm's payment o®ers to the laboratory, and hence the laboratory's ability to earn excess bene¯ts.
Equilibrium R&D in the non-cooperative game is known to be lower (higher) than in the cooperative
setting for low (high) direct spillovers (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988). We show that R&D is
greater (smaller) in the delegated game than in the cooperative one for positive (negative) indirect
spillovers. This occurs because the laboratory internalizes the strategic interaction of the two ¯rms on
the intermediate market for technology and on the ¯nal market for products via the payment schemes
it receives. As a result the laboratory's choice of R&D is equivalent to it maximizing the sum of
its bene¯ts and the two ¯rms' pro¯ts. In particular, zero within-laboratory externalities mean the
equilibrium outcomes of the delegated R&D and cooperative R&D games are identical. When ¯rms
delegate R&D, the complementarity of their research projects means that the laboratory can produce
R&D more e±ciently than the ¯rms. Hence, R&D in the delegated game can exceed the non-cooperative
solution even when direct externalities are negative - in which case R&D in the non-cooperative game
exceeds that in the cooperative one - provided indirect externalities are su±ciently positive. For similar
reasons delegated R&D may exceed the non-cooperative solution when direct externalities are positive
provided indirect externalities are not too negative.
When ¯rms delegate R&D to the laboratory, they earn higher pro¯ts as indirect externalities
increase. This arises because (i) it is relatively cheaper for the laboratory to perform R&D, than for
¯rms to conduct it in house, as indirect externalities increase, while (ii) simultaneously the increased
complementarity between the ¯rms' R&D services means they can reduce their transfer payments to
the laboratory. We show that ¯rms' pro¯ts are higher when they delegate R&D to the laboratory,
than in the other two organizational forms, for su±ciently high indirect externalities. However, for
reasons given above, there is no guarantee that the laboratory will choose to operate at such high
levels of indirect externalities. If the laboratory must earn positive bene¯ts to participate, the ¯rms
4choose to delegate R&D only when direct externalities are low. This result di®ers sharply from the
well established claim that R&D cooperation (as opposed to delegation) becomes more pro¯table with
increasingly high direct externalities.
The welfare analysis proceeds by observing that higher R&D implies lower prices, more consump-
tion, and consequently higher consumer surplus. We ¯nd that R&D delegation Pareto-dominates
cooperation and non-cooperation, and the laboratory earns positive bene¯ts, if and only if R&D ser-
vices are su±ciently complementary inside the laboratory and inter-¯rm spillovers are su±ciently low.
This occurs because (i) the laboratory operates only for su±ciently low indirect externalities, whereas
(ii) ¯rms earn higher pro¯ts and consumers obtain more surplus with delegated R&D than in the other
two settings only for su±ciently high indirect externalities. This opposition prevents at least one of the
parties (the laboratory, the ¯rms, or consumers) to gain strictly more in the delegated R&D game than
in the other two games when spillovers are too high. From a policy perspective, we prove that a ¯rm's
choice to delegate R&D to an independent pro¯t-making laboratory never harms consumers. Hence,
there is no room for policy intervention when R&D delegation takes place along the lines described in
this paper.
The present analysis complements papers on the industrial organization of R&D, in the spirit
of Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (2001), which examine the impact of non-
deterministic R&D on the relative e±ciency of a separate governance structure (where a single user
buys an innovation from an independent unit) and an integrated structure (in which the user sources
R&D internally). Both Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (2001) assume a unique
R&D user. We, on the other hand, are interested in the strategic interaction of several ¯rms which
not only contract with a common laboratory but also compete on the product market.9 Another more
recent strand of the R&D literature analyzes cooperative R&D in vertically-related industries (Banerjee
and Lin 2001, Banerjee and Lin 2003, Atallah 2002, Brocas 2003, Ishii 2004, for example). In these
papers, ¯rms may bene¯t from imperfectly appropriable process R&D produced not only by a direct
5competitor, but also by upstream or downstream ¯rms. What is transacted by ¯rms between successive
stages of production is an homogeneous input to be transformed in some ¯nal good, not R&D services.
Although this framework is perfectly valid for some settings, the examples provided here concern the
delegation of R&D services.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the three R&D games, de¯nes and
discusses the equilibrium concepts. Section 3 establishes that the laboratory maximizes aggregate
bene¯ts and derives conditions under which it earns zero bene¯ts. Section 4 ranks the outcomes of the
three R&D games as a function of ¯rm-level technological spillovers and within-laboratory spillovers,
and illustrate the results graphically in the direct and indirect externalities plane. Next, section 5
investigates whether one of the three games can Pareto-dominate the other two and discusses policy
implications. Finally, section 6 concludes. All proofs and ¯gures are in the Appendix.
2 R&D Games
We consider a duopoly which faces a linear inverse demand function:
pi(q) = a ¡ b(qi + µqj); (1)
for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j; where q ´ (qi;qj) 2 R2
+ describes output quantities, pi is ¯rm i's unit price, a
and b are positive parameters, and µ 2 [0;1] captures the degree of substitutability between the two
products. Each ¯rm incurs a constant unit cost of production which it can reduce through process
innovations. We also assume, as in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), a unit cost of production:
ci(x) = c ¡ xi ¡ ¯xj; (2)
6for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j; where x ´ (xi;xj) 2 R2
+ is the vector of R&D outputs obtained by ¯rms, the
marginal cost parameter c 2 (0;a), and ¯ 2 [0;1] denotes technological spillovers. It follows that ¯rm
i's gross pro¯t function is:
¼i(q;x) = [pi(q) ¡ ci(x)]qi: (3)
The next section formalizes three cost-reducing R&D games in extensive forms.
2.1 Cooperative R&D
In a ¯rst stage, the duopoly cooperatively chooses in-house R&D outcomes in the two proprietary






for i = 1;2; and where ° is a positive parameter. In a second stage, given the chosen R&D outcomes
each ¯rm non-cooperatively maximizes individual pro¯ts by choosing its output. In this game, we
denote ¯rm i's net pro¯t, as a function of x; by:
¼c
i(x) ´ ¼i(qc;x) ¡ r(xi); (5)
where qc ´ (qc
1(x);qc
2(x)). Firms' symmetric net equilibrium pro¯ts are denoted by ¼c.
De¯nition 1 (NE) The symmetric ¯nal market outcome qc is a Nash equilibrium if:
¼i(qc;x) ¸ ¼i(qi;qc
j(x);x); (6)
all x, all qi, i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
7Instead of cooperatively choosing their R&D, ¯rms may decide to do so non-cooperatively, as
explained below.
2.2 Non-Cooperative R&D
In a ¯rst stage, ¯rms non-cooperatively conduct R&D in-house by maximizing their individual pro¯ts
in their own R&D, with each ¯rm's R&D costs given by (4). The second stage is as in the cooperative
R&D game. In this game, we denote ¯rm i's net pro¯t as a function of x by:
¼n
i (x) ´ ¼i(qn;x) ¡ r(xi); (7)
where qn ´ (qn
1(x);qn
2(x)). Firms' symmetric net equilibrium pro¯ts are denoted by ¼n.
De¯nition 2 (SPNE) The symmetric equilibrium quantities and in-house R&D outcomes (qn;xn)
are a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if:
i) qn is a NE as in De¯nition 1, and
ii) xn is a NE, that is ¼n
i (xn) ¸ ¼n
i (xi;xn
j); for all xi, i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
This game is identical to another one where, in lieu of in-house R&D production, there are two
independent laboratories. In that alternative game, each ¯rm writes a contract with one exclusive lab-
oratory to obtain speci¯c R&D services in exchange of transfer payments. In our complete information
setup, it follows that a ¯rm's problem is as in (7), but r(xi) is now ¯rm i's payment for xi; and the
laboratory earns zero bene¯ts. The problem is however di®erent if there is a unique, common, and
independent laboratory, from which the two ¯rms buy R&D services. We tackle this next.
82.3 Delegated R&D
In a ¯rst stage, the two ¯rms (principals) simultaneously and non cooperatively purchase x1 and x2
by o®ering contingent transfer payments ti(x) to one common laboratory (an agent). In light of the
examples given in the introduction, we let each ¯rm's transfer be a function of x1 and x2. This captures
the fact that real-world contracts include various non-compete clauses and property rights protections
that subordinate payments to exclusivity conditions, as documented in introduction. Several explana-
tions for the fact that buyers of new knowledge write contracts can be found in the literature. In a
cross-sectorial empirical analysis, Veugelers (1997) remarks that when in-house facilities are available,
as we assume in the present paper, the capacity to go for it alone increases a ¯rm's bargaining power
in negotiating with an external laboratory. On the intermediate market for biotechnology, where R&D
buyers are large pharmaceutical, agribusiness, or chemical ¯rms, Lerner and Merges (1998) evoke the
¯nancial constraints faced by specialized laboratories, and Argyres and Liebeskind (2002) refer to a
high rate of entry on the supply side.
For each ¯rm, we denote the set of transfer payments by:
T ´ ftjt(x) ¸ 0 for all xg: (8)
In a second stage, given t ´ (t1;t2); the laboratory chooses the amounts of ¯rm-speci¯c R&D
services, at a cost s(x), that maximize its bene¯t given by:
L(x) = t1(x) + t2(x) ¡ s(x): (9)
We assume that the laboratory may choose to contract with no ¯rm, in which case it earns zero bene¯ts.
This leads to a participation constraint:
L ¸ 0: (10)
9When discussing policy implications later, we shall consider situations where (10) holds with strict
inequality. This would be the case if the laboratory incurs positive (arbitrarily small) installation
costs, or faces a pro¯table outside option. We denote the set of R&D services which, given strategies
t, maximize the laboratory's bene¯ts by:
X(t) ´ argmax
x L(x(t)): (11)
The third stage is as the ¯nal stage in the other two games.
To compare the delegation of R&D with the cooperative and non-cooperative cases of reference,
we keep the assumption that information is complete among ¯rms. However, this does not extend
to the laboratory, which needs not know downstream cost and demand functions. An outcome of the
delegated R&D game is a three-tuple (xd;td;qd), where xd denotes the laboratory's equilibrium choice,
td ¯rms' equilibrium payments, and qd equilibrium quantities on the ¯nal market. In this game ¯rm
i's net pro¯t, as a function of x; equals:
¼d
i (x) ´ ¼i(qd;x) ¡ td
i (x); (12)
where qd ´ (qd
1(x);qd
2(x)). The laboratory bears all R&D costs, while the functional form of ¯rms' net
pro¯ts in the delegated R&D game is similar to Cr¶ emer and Riordan (1987) who model multilateral
transactions with bilateral contracts, but with transfer payments that are here contingent on the
laboratory's choice of R&D outputs. Firms' symmetric net equilibrium pro¯ts are denoted by ¼d.
De¯nition 3 (TSPNE) The symmetric equilibrium delegated R&D outcomes, transfer payments, and
equilibrium quantities (xd;td;qd) are a truthful subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if:
i) qd is a NE as in De¯nition 1,
10ii) (xd;td) is a NE, that is xd 2 X(td) and there is no i = 1;2, ti 2 T, and no x 2 X(ti;td
j) such
that ¼d
i (x) > ¼d
i (xd); and
iii) td
i is truthful relative to xd, that is for all x either ¼d
i (x) = ¼d
i (xd), or ¼d
i (x) < ¼d
i (xd) and
td
i (x) = 0, i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
Intuitively, in any truthful equilibrium, a ¯rm o®ers a transfer td
i (x) that exactly re°ects its indi-
vidual valuation of the laboratory's choice of x with respect to xd, all x. De¯nition 3-iii) refers to two
possible cases. Either gross pro¯ts ¼i(qd(x);x) exceed net equilibrium pro¯ts ¼i(qd(xd);xd) ¡ td
i (xd),
and the di®erence between transfer o®ers td
i (xd) and td
i (x) is set equal to the di®erence between gross
pro¯ts ¼i(qd(xd);xd) and ¼i(qd(x);x). Or principal i's gross pro¯ts with x are strictly less than net
equilibrium pro¯ts obtained with xd), in which case the transfer td
i (x) is set to zero.
For this game, as in Laussel and Le Breton (2001), by equilibria we mean truthful subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria, and we recall two properties that justify the choice of this solution concept. Firstly,
for any set of transfer o®ers by any one of the two ¯rms, there exists a truthful strategy in the other
¯rm's best-response correspondence. This existence property implies that a ¯rm can restrict itself to
truthful strategies. Secondly, all truthful Nash equilibria are coalition-proof. This stability property
says that total net pro¯ts, as obtained in a truthful subgame-perfect equilibrium by the two ¯rms, are
higher than in any other subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. The two properties hold for all given choices
of q in the ¯nal stage, including qd.10






2) ¡ ±x1x2; (13)
for i = 1;2 and i 6= j, and ± 2 [¡°;°) captures complementary (substitutable) R&D services in the
laboratory if ± > 0 (± < 0). If ± = 0; the laboratory is as e±cient as each ¯rm's proprietary laboratory.
11Note that the term ±x1x2 in (13) is the simplest way to capture complementarity or substitutability
between two variables. A nice aspect of this formalization is that complementarity or substitutability
is re°ected by the sign a single parameter as suggested by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 517) in an
illustrative example. The same algebraic speci¯cation appears in the complete information version of
the cost function of a common agent in Martimort and Stole (2003a), and in the utility function of a
common agent in Martimort and Stole (2003b). The existence of within-laboratory spillovers gives rise
to indirect externalities, which are de¯ned, and contrasted with between-¯rm technological spillovers,
below.
2.4 Direct and Indirect Externalities
De¯ne ¯rm i's concentrated pro¯ts as ¼i(x) ´ ¼(q(x);x): In all three games, concentrated pro¯ts vary
with technological spillovers which are captured by ¯. These spillovers are a direct externality because
¯rm i's gross pro¯ts not only depend on xi, but also on xj for all ¯ > 0: These externalities are negative
(positive) if an increase in xj has a negative (positive) impact on ¯rm i's concentrated pro¯ts.











In what follows, we identify positive (negative) direct externalities with ¯ > (<)µ=2:
As for indirect externalities, they appear only in the delegated R&D game where the laboratory's
choice of xi a®ects the costs of providing xj, with i 6= j: Indirect externalities are negative (positive)
if serving higher quantities to a ¯rm makes it more (less) costly for the laboratory to serve the other
one, i.e. if the production of R&D services are substitutable (complementary). More formally:











Typically, R&D services are complements (i.e., ± > 0) when the laboratory can serve the two ¯rms
by using the same resources. They are substitutes (i.e., ± < 0) when there are bottlenecks in the
laboratory's capacity to simultaneously supply the two ¯rm-speci¯c services.
We now establish how the laboratory's choice compares with the cooperative game. We then derive
a condition under which the laboratory earns positive bene¯ts. This condition partitions the (¯;°)
space, which we refer to as the externalities plane in the remainder of the paper.
3 Pro¯ts Maximization and Distribution
Let the aggregate bene¯ts function for the two ¯rms and the laboratory be:
¤(x) = ¼d
1(x) + ¼d
2(x) ¡ s(x): (14)
Proposition 1 (Joint Pro¯ts Maximization) In all TSPNE, the laboratory's choice of R&D ser-
vices to maximize its bene¯ts (9) is equivalent to maximizing aggregate bene¯ts (14).
Proposition 1 is a restatement of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) adapted to our context. It says
that the non-cooperative attempt by ¯rms to maximize individual pro¯ts by delegating R&D leads
to a choice of x that maximizes the aggregate bene¯ts of all parties, including the laboratory. By
maximizing the sum of the two ¯rms pro¯ts, net of R&D costs, the laboratory internalizes both direct
and indirect externalities. However, Proposition 1 is silent on consumers' welfare. We will be able to
13address this issue once we compute the quantities of R&D services produced by the laboratory and
compare them to the two other games. This is the subject of section 4.1.
Denote by ¤ the maximum aggregate bene¯ts obtained by maximizing (14) with respect to x. The
following proposition characterize
Proposition 2 (Joint Pro¯ts Distribution) There exists a continuous strictly decreasing frontier
in the externalities plane (¯;±), denoted by ±L=0; and which includes the point (µ=2;0), such that in all
TSPNE the laboratory earns positive bene¯ts if ± < ±L=0; and exactly breaks even otherwise.
Proposition 2 says that the magnitude of indirect externalities (±), for a given value of direct exter-
nalities (¯), determines the laboratory's ability to appropriate a share of innovation bene¯ts, and thus
laboratory's participation constraint (10) to be slack or binding. This is because indirect externalities,
in combination with technological spillovers, impact the nature of competition between the two ¯rms
on the intermediate market for R&D. This competition is re°ected by their o®ers of transfer payments
(td
1(x);td
2(x)). On the one hand, if both externalities are negative, a ¯rm's concentrated pro¯ts decrease
with the other ¯rm's R&D (Property 1), and serving one ¯rm increases the laboratory's cost of serving
the other (Property 2). This is a case of tough competition between the two ¯rms for the laboratory's
services, which is a source of positive pro¯ts for it. On the other hand, if both externalities are positive,
a ¯rm's concentrated pro¯ts are increasing in the other ¯rm's R&D, and serving one ¯rm decreases
the laboratory's cost of serving the other. Thus, competition for the laboratory's resources is relatively
soft and the laboratory earns no bene¯ts. When the externalities are of opposite signs, the laboratory's
ability to appropriate bene¯ts depends on their magnitudes. This opposition gives rise to ±L=0, which
can thus be viewed as a weighted sum of direct and indirect externalities.
Propositions 1 and 2 are useful for the comparison of the three R&D games outcomes at the pivotal
no-externalities point (¯;±) = (µ=2;0).
14Proposition 3 (The No-Externalities Case) The outcomes of the three games are the same at the
pivotal no-externalities point.
At the pivotal point, there are no direct and indirect externalities. This implies that solutions in x are
the same in the three R&D games. In the delegated game the laboratory earns zero bene¯ts, as if ¯rms
were relying on in-house R&D capabilities, because (¯;±) = (µ=2;0) is on ±L=0. We now solve the three
R&D games by backward induction and rank the performance of the three games in the externalities
plane. The explicit solutions of the games are in Appendix A.
4 Comparing the Three Games
We partition the externalities plane by deriving frontiers on which R&D, pro¯ts, or welfare are equal
in the delegated R&D game and in one of the two alternative games. By welfare, we mean the sum of
consumer surplus, ¯rms' pro¯ts, and the laboratory's bene¯ts. For the sake of completeness, we also
include the comparison of the outcomes of the cooperative and non-comparative games as established
by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Note from the onset that, as a result of Proposition 3 all such
frontiers include the pivotal no-externalities point.
4.1 R&D outcomes
Lemma 1 (Cooperative, Non-Cooperative, and Delegated R&D)









±L=0 > ±xd=xc = 0 for ¯ < µ=2;
±L=0 = ±xd=xc = 0 for ¯ = µ=2;
15±L=0 < ±xd=xc = 0 for ¯ > µ=2:









0 < ±xd=xn < ±L=0 for ¯ < µ=2;
±L=0 = ±xd=xn = 0 for ¯ = µ=2;
0 > ±xd=xn > ±L=0 for ¯ > µ=2:
Direct and indirect externalities combine to give Lemma 1. First consider Lemma 1-(i). The
cooperative and delegated games yield the same R&D solution when there are no indirect externalities
because of Proposition 1 (which says that the laboratory maximizes aggregate bene¯ts in equilibrium),
and of Property 2 (which implies that costs are the same in both games when ± = 0). We know that the
independent laboratory is more (less) e±cient than in-house laboratories when indirect externalities
are positive (negative), that is when ± > 0 (± < 0). This completes the partitioning of the externalities
plane for R&D output in the two games under scrutiny.
Second, consider Lemma 1-(ii). Recall that, from Property 1, optimal R&D is greater (smaller) in
the cooperative than in the non-cooperative game for positive (negative) direct externalities. Let direct
externalities be positive. If indirect externalities are also positive, the laboratory's higher e±ciency
means that delegated R&D exceeds the cooperative, and hence the non-cooperative, solutions. If
indirect externalities are negative, the laboratory is at a disadvantage in the production of R&D
over in-house laboratories. However, as it internalizes inter-¯rm direct externalities via the transfer
payments it receives, it is only for su±ciently negative indirect externalities that non-cooperative R&D
exceeds the delegated game solution. Consequently, ±xd=xn must cross in the South-East quadrant of
the externalities plane.
16Now let direct externalities be negative. If indirect externalities are also negative, the laboratory's
lower e±ciency than in-house laboratories means that the delegated solution is smaller than the co-
operative, and by transitivity of the non-cooperative one also. However, as the laboratory gains in
e±ciency as ± increases, there exist su±ciently high positive indirect externalities for the R&D out-
come under the delegated game to exceed that under the non-cooperative game. Hence ±xd=xn must
lie in the North-West quadrant of the externalities plane.
[Insert ¯gure 1 about here]
The juxtaposition of ±xd=xc and ±xd=xn in the externalities plane, as illustrated in Figure 1, allows us
to rank optimal R&D across the three games. It is of interest that optimal R&D in the delegated game
is greater than in either of the two games for su±ciently high indirect externalities, even when direct
externalities are negative. This result stands in contrast with cooperative R&D always being less than
non-cooperative one for negative direct externalities.
4.2 Firms' Pro¯ts
Lemma 2 (Cooperative, Non-Cooperative, and Delegated Pro¯ts)









0 < ±¼d=¼c < ±L=0 for ¯ < µ=2;
±¼d=¼c = ±L=0 = 0 for ¯ = µ=2;
0 = ±¼d=¼c > ±L=0 for ¯ > µ=2:









0 < ±xd=xn < ±¼d=¼n < ±¼d=¼c for ¯ < µ=2;
±xd=xn = ±¼d=¼n = ±¼d=¼c = 0 for ¯ = µ=2;
0 = ±¼d=¼c > ±¼d=¼n > ±xd=xn for ¯ > µ=2:
The intuition for ±¼d=¼c follows also from how the two externalities combine. For the same reasons
as in Section 4.1, aggregate bene¯ts are ceteris paribus increasing in indirect externalities. However,
when part of the aggregate bene¯ts accrue to the laboratory, which is the case for ± < ±L=0; then
indirect externalities must be su±ciently positive to generate enough surplus to compensate for the
laboratory's bene¯ts. Hence, if direct externalities are negative, the locus which equalizes ¯rms' pro¯ts
in the delegated and cooperative games must lie in the North-West quadrant of the externalities plane.
It cannot however lie above ±L=0 where aggregate bene¯ts in the delegated game exceed those in the
cooperative game, but are divided equally between the two ¯rms. If direct externalities are positive,
the frontier is confounded with ± = 0 because of Proposition 1, the cost structure being the same in
both games and the laboratory earning zero bene¯ts.
The intuition for the ±¼d=¼n locus is as follows. Recall that a ¯rm's pro¯ts in the cooperative game
always exceed those under the non-cooperative one because cooperation internalizes direct externalities
and prevents R&D duplication. As a ¯rm's pro¯ts in both the cooperative and delegated games are
equal along ±¼d=¼c; by transitivity delegated pro¯ts exceed non-cooperative ones along that locus.
Consider negative direct externalities. For ± = 0; along that line cooperative pro¯ts are greater than
those obtained in the delegated game. However, ¯rms' pro¯ts in the delegated game are increasing in
18indirect externalities (Lemma D-2 in Appendix D). Hence, there exists a unique decreasing continuous
locus in the North-West quadrant of Figure 2 such that ¼d = ¼n:
By the same token, there must exist a locus in the South-East quadrant of Figure 2 which equalizes
pro¯ts in the delegated and non-cooperative games. That locus must lie below ±xd=xn for the following
reason. Along ±xd=xn optimal R&D expenditures are equal in both the delegated and non-cooperative
games. However, the laboratory is less e±cient than in-house R&D when there are negative indirect
externalities. It follows that aggregate bene¯ts in the non-cooperative game exceed those in the dele-
gated game along that locus. As the laboratory does not earn negative pro¯ts, ¼d < ¼n along ±xd=xn.
Therefore ±¼d=¼n lies above ±xd=xn.
[Insert ¯gure 2 about here]
Figure 2 graphs ±¼d=¼c and ±¼d=¼n to compare ¯rms' pro¯ts in the three games. As expected, ¯rms'
pro¯ts are highest in the delegated game when both externalities are positive. However, delegated R&D
may yield the lowest pro¯ts even if direct externalities are weakly negative and indirect externalities are
weakly positive (region below ±¼d=¼n in Figure 2). This occurs because in that region the laboratory
earns positive bene¯ts and indirect externalities do not have a high enough impact on aggregate bene¯ts.
Hence, positive indirect externalities are necessary but not su±cient for ¯rms to prefer the delegated
game to the other two. Note that the ¯rms' pro¯ts results have a benchmark °avor, in the sense
that the net bene¯ts obtained by a laboratory endowed with some informational advantage, would be
bounded from below by the equilibrium bene¯ts obtained here.
194.3 Welfare
Lemma 3 (Cooperative, Non-Cooperative, and Delegated Welfare)









0 = ±wd=wc < ±L=0 for ¯ < µ=2;
0 = ±wd=wc = ±L=0 for ¯ = µ=2;
0 = ±wd=wc > ±L=0 for ¯ > µ=2:









0 < ±wd=wn < ±xd=xn < ±¼d=¼n for ¯ < µ=2;
±wd=wn = ±xd=xn = ±¼d=¼n = 0 for ¯ = µ=2;
0 > ±¼d=¼n > ±wd=wn > ±xd=xn for ¯ > µ=2:
The frontier ±wd=wc is the direct consequence of Property 2, Proposition 1, and aggregate bene¯ts
being increasing in indirect externalities. To understand the intuition for ±wd=wn; let direct externalities
be negative (i.e., ¯ < µ=2). If ± = 0 in that region, both optimal R&D and ¯rms' pro¯ts in the
delegated game are smaller than in the non-cooperative game by Lemmas 1-(ii) and 2-(ii) respectively.
Therefore, when indirect externalities are negative, wd < wn along ± = 0: Second, aggregate bene¯ts
in the delegated game must be greater than in the non-cooperative game along ±xd=xn because the
laboratory is more e±cient than in-house R&D facilities, and by de¯nition the same amount of R&D is
performed in both games. Moreover, wd is increasing in ± (see Lemma D-3 in Appendix D). It follows
20that for each ¯ in the region bounded by ± = 0 and ±xd=xn, there exists a value for ± such that welfare
in the delegated and non-cooperative games are equal. The existence of ±wd=wn in the South-East
quadrant of the externalities plane can be rationalized in the same way.
[Insert ¯gure 3 about here]
5 Pareto Optimal R&D Organization and Policy Discussion
The juxtaposition of Proposition 2, Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 in the externalities plane allows us to investigate
whether one of the three games can Pareto-dominate the other two.
Theorem 1 The frontiers established in Proposition 2 and Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are such that:
±L=0 > ±¼d=¼c > ±¼d=¼n > ±xd=xn > ±wd=wn > ±wd=wc = ±xd=xc = 0 for 0 · ¯ < µ=2;
±L=0 = ±¼d=¼c = ±¼d=¼n = ±xd=xn = ±wd=wn = ±wd=wc = ±xd=xc = 0 for ¯ = µ=2;
0 = ±xd=xc = ±¼d=¼c = ±wd=wc > ±¼d=¼n > ±wd=wn > ±xd=xn > ±L=0 for µ=2 < ¯ · 1:
(15)
All frontiers are de¯ned on [¡°;°), and the fact they intersect for ¯ = µ=2 stems from Proposition
3. For (¯;±) such that 0 · ¯ < µ=2 and ±L=0 < ± < ±¼d=¼c, the laboratory earns positive bene¯ts
(as opposed to zero pro¯ts otherwise). Moreover, in that region, consumer surplus (as inferred from
R&D outcomes), and ¯rms' equilibrium pro¯ts, are strictly higher in the delegated game than in the
equilibria of cooperative and non-cooperative games. This does not hold elsewhere in the externalities
plane, as can be checked from (15).
Corollary 1 (Delegation Dominance) The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two
games, and the laboratory earns positive pro¯ts, for 0 · ¯ < µ=2 and ±¼d=¼c < ± < ±L=0.
21We have therefore established that for certain levels of externalities, consumers, ¯rms, and the
laboratory all bene¯t from the delegation of R&D. Therefore, delegated R&D is a Pareto optimal
organizational form. For simple reasons, this cannot occur when direct and indirect externalities are
positive. In that case, the delegated game yields the highest pro¯ts and consumer surplus, but the
laboratory earns no bene¯ts because ¯rms' interests are congruent. For opposite reasons, welfare is
minimized under the delegated game if both direct and indirect externalities are su±ciently negative,
although in this case a laboratory would earn positive pro¯ts. What is crucial for the delegated R&D
game to Pareto dominate the other two games, is that indirect externalities must not be too high, so
that the ¯rms must still compete for the laboratory's resources, which thus earns positive bene¯ts and
participates. But indirect externalities must be high enough to make welfare greater than in the other
two games, and let ¯rms obtain more of it than under the two other options.
[Insert ¯gure 4 about here]
We can now use these results to examine when the interests of ¯rms and consumers con°ict or
coincide. This is an important question because ¯rms decide to delegate R&D only if it is pro¯table for
them to do so, and if the laboratory participates. We ¯nd that, although no one asks for consumers'
consent, ¯rms' privately pro¯table decision to delegate R&D is always socially optimal. To see that,
remark ¯rst that in all three games consumer surplus increases with R&D because lower costs lead
to higher quantities and lower prices (see Appendix D-3). Second, in the externalities plane, for all
values of direct spillovers, ¯rms ¯nd it more pro¯table to delegate R&D than to do R&D in-house
either cooperatively or non-cooperatively if and only if ± is above ±¼d=¼c (Theorem 1). Now remark
that ±¼d=¼c is the \highest" pro¯t frontier and that it is also always above the two frontiers ±xd=xc and
±xd=xn which allow us to compare the consumer surpluses obtained in all three games equilibria (see
Figures 1 and 2). Hence, ¯rms never ¯nd it pro¯table to delegate R&D with consumers being worse
22o® than in either of the two other games (as would be the case if we had, say, ±¼d=¼c < ±xd=xc for some
values of ¯).
A more striking result is obtained when the laboratory must earn strictly positive pro¯ts to par-
ticipate (i.e., (10) is replaced by L > 0). This occurs if the laboratory has an outside option where
it can earn some arbitrarily small positive net bene¯ts. In that case, ¯rms delegate R&D only if ± is
between ±¼d=¼c and ±L=0 when direct externalities are negative (i.e., 0 · ¯ < µ=2). They cannot rely
on the laboratory's R&D services when direct externalities are positive (i.e. µ=2 < ¯ · 1) because the
frontier above which the laboratory earns zero bene¯ts (±L=0) lies below all the other frontiers in that
region (see Figure 2). Consequently, when the laboratory must make positive bene¯ts to participate,
¯rms will pro¯tably delegate R&D services only when externalities fall in the Pareto dominating region
de¯ned in Corollary 1 and which corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 4. A straightforward policy
implication is that, when ¯rms behave as described here, there is no motivation for a regulator to
constrain ¯rms' choice to delegate R&D.
6 Conclusion
R&D outsourcing (delegation) is an increasingly important phenomenon, and many rivals delegate
R&D to a common independent laboratory. While many theoretical industrial organization models
compare the outcomes of ¯rms doing R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively, none has, to the best of
our knowledge, investigated R&D delegation in a formal setup and compared the three modes of R&D.
This paper ¯lls that gap by setting up a simple model where competitors can independently choose to
delegate R&D to a pro¯t-maximizing laboratory.
Our model of delegated R&D builds on the literature where a ¯rm's R&D reduces not only its unit
cost of production but also that of its competitor through technological spillovers (direct externalities).
The R&D projects which ¯rms delegate to the laboratory give rise to an additional externality because
23they can be complements (positive indirect externalities), substitutes (negative indirect externalities),
or independent. Positive (negative) indirect externalities can be associated with economies of scope
(a congestion) in the production of R&D. We characterize the impact of these two externalities on
delegated R&D outcomes, ¯rms' pro¯ts, social welfare, and the laboratory's bene¯ts. We compare the
outcomes of delegated R&D to an independent pro¯t-maximizing laboratory to ¯rms doing in-house
R&D either non-cooperatively or cooperatively. One interesting aspect of our analysis is the ability to
illustrate the results graphically by fully partitioning the plane of between-¯rm technological spillovers
and within-laboratory R&D externalities, for all dimensions of the comparison.
We establish a number of novel results. First, positive indirect externalities are not su±cient for
¯rms to delegate R&D to a common laboratory which needs positive bene¯ts to participate. R&D
delegation takes place if indirect externalities are not too positive (negative) when direct externalities
are negative (positive). When indirect externalities are too high they counteract direct externalities
and the laboratory only breaks even. Second, su±ciently high direct and indirect externalities are
necessary and su±cient for optimal R&D, ¯rms' pro¯ts, and social welfare to be highest when ¯rms
delegate R&D. Third, the laboratory participates and the delegated R&D game Pareto-dominates
the other two games if (i) direct externalities are su±ciently negative (for ¯rms to compete for the
laboratory's services); and (ii) indirect externalities are positive (so that ¯rms bene¯t from economies
of scope) but not too high (for the laboratory to earn positive bene¯ts). We prove that such a region
always exists. Finally, our ¯ndings have a laissez-faire °avor: no regulatory intervention is required
when ¯rms decide to delegate R&D to a pro¯t-seeking laboratory. This strong statement arises because,
in this model, the privately pro¯table choice to contract with a laboratory also bene¯ts consumers.
Indeed, prima-facie evidence would suggest that R&D outsourcing is not subject to any regulation.
This paper is a ¯rst step in the analysis of procurement markets for new technology with multiple
buyers. Since we use standard yet speci¯c algebraic speci¯cations of the cost and demand functions,
future work could also test the robustness of the results to changes in the formal speci¯cations of the
24compared games. We take a ¯rst step in that direction by using Amir (2000) to specify a modi¯ed cost
function for the laboratory so as to investigate situations where R&D is conceived as expenditures (i.e.,
inputs), rather than outputs.11 All our results remain valid. In another positive test of robustness, we
show that our results are qualitatively similar when ¯rms behave µ a la Bertrand in the product market
stage of all three R&D games. These proofs are available from the authors upon request.
Among the open questions it remains to investigate what happens when R&D e®orts lead to product
innovations. This could be done by assuming that R&D increases quality by using a framework in the
spirit of Symeonidis (2003). It would be also natural to consider more than two ¯rms. However, beyond
usual tractability di±culties in computing the equilibrium, this would imply a qualitative leap in the
characterization of the joint bene¯ts function of the laboratory and any subset of ¯rms.12 Finally,
our analysis, and the whole literature on which it is based, can be criticized by its assumption of
deterministic R&D. To address that critique one may examine situations where the true cost of a R&D
program is unknown before it starts.13
25Appendix
A Explicit Solutions of the Three R&D Games
As standard we proceed backwards. Section A.1 solves for each ¯rm's output on the ¯nal market,
which is common to three games. Then in section A.2, we solve for a ¯rm's symmetric R&D in each
one of the three games.
A.1 Final Market Stage
Each ¯rm chooses output to maximize its gross pro¯ts (3). This yields two reaction functions, which
we use to solve for each ¯rm's subgame Cournot-Nash equilibrium output as a function of x:
qi(x) =
®(2 ¡ µ) + (2 ¡ µ¯)xi ¡ (µ ¡ 2¯)xj
(2 ¡ µ)(2 + µ)b
; (16)
for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j; and where ® ´ a ¡ c: Making use of (1) and (16) into (3) we obtain:
¼i(x) = b[qi(x)]2; (17)
for i = 1;2. Now we turn to the R&D stage which is speci¯c to each R&D game.
A.2 R&D Stage
De¯ne the following three terms:
¡1 ´ b° (2 + µ)
2 ¡ 2(1 + ¯)
2 ;
¡2 ´ b° (2 ¡ µ)
2 (2 + µ)
2 ¡ 2(2 ¡ µ¯)
2 ;
¡3 ´ b(° ¡ ±)(2 + µ)
2 ¡ 2(1 + ¯)
2 :
26In the remainder of the paper we assume that ¡1, ¡2 and ¡3 are positive which guarantee that the
objective function in the cooperative, non-cooperative and delegated games respectively are concave.
We also de¯ne:
¡4 ´ b°(2 ¡ µ)(2 + µ)2 ¡ 2(1 + ¯)(2 ¡ µ¯);
which we also assume to be positive. This will simplify the notation in what follows.
In the non-cooperative case, Henriques (1990) establishes that reaction functions in the R&D space
cross \correctly" when j@xi=@xjj is less than 1. Using our notational this reads as:
j¡2(2 ¡ ¯µ)(2¯ ¡ µ)j
¡2
< 1: (18)
Remark that (18) for all ¯ when b = µ = 1 and ° = 2, which are the values we used to draw Figures 1
to 4.
A.2.1 Cooperative R&D
The two ¯rms' joint net pro¯ts are given by:






where ¼1(x) and ¼2(x) are given by (17). We maximize (19) with respect to x1 and x2 to obtain the
symmetric cooperative R&D outcome and individual ¯rm pro¯ts respectively as:
xc = 2(1 + ¯)®=¡1; (20)
¼c = °®2=¡1: (21)
27A.2.2 Non-Cooperative R&D
Each ¯rm chooses its R&D independently to maximize its net pro¯ts (7). This yields two reaction
functions, which we use to solve for a symmetric non-cooperative R&D outcome:
xn = 2®(2 ¡ µ¯)=¡4: (22)





Proposition 1 states the choice of R&D services by the laboratory is equivalent to maximizing aggregate
bene¯ts (14) with respect to x1 and x2. This gives each ¯rm's symmetric delegated R&D outcome:
xd = 2(1 + ¯)®=¡3: (24)
Substituting (24) into (14), using the laboratory's explicit cost function (13), and simplifying gives
aggregate bene¯ts:
¤ = 2(° ¡ ±)®2=¡3: (25)
Both (24) and (25) are non-negative because by assumption ± 2 [¡°;°); ¯ 2 [0;1] and ¡3 is positive.
B Proofs of Properties 1 and 2





(2 ¡ µ)(2 + µ)
qi(x); (26)
28for i = 1;2, i 6= j. As µ 2 [0;1], equation (26) is of the same sign as (2¯ ¡ µ) for a positive output, or
equals zero otherwise.
The proof of Property 2 follows directly from di®erentiating (13) with respect to xi and xj.
C Proof of Propositions
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 is a simple adaptation in the notation from Bernheim and Whinston (1986,
¯rst part of Theorem 2 on page 14, and proof on pages 24-25). It is available upon request from the
authors.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let N = f1;2g, and 2N = f;;f1g;f2g;f1;2gg. We build on Laussel and Le Breton (2001) { henceforth






¼i(x) ¡ s(x); (27)
where s(x) is given by (13) and ¼i(x) by (17). This function gives the highest joint-bene¯ts of the lab-
oratory and any subset M of ¯rms in N, with ¼(;) = ¼1(0;0)+¼2(0;0), that is the sum of concentrated
pro¯ts with no R&D (a normalization). Then the proof consists in investigating additive properties
of ¼ on 2N in order to exploit a series of theorems that characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the
delegated R&D game.
² From LLB's Theorem 3.1 (p. 102), if ¼(M) is strictly subadditive, that is:
¼(f1;2g) < ¼(f1g) + ¼(f2g); (28)
29then the laboratory earns positive bene¯ts in all equilibria, that is L > 0.
² From LLB's Theorem 3.3 (p. 104), if ¼(M) is strictly subadditive, then #N = 2 implies that
¯rms' symmetric pro¯ts in the delegated R&D game are:
¼d = ¤ ¡ ¼(fig); (29)
i = 1;2.
² From LLB's Theorem 3.2 (p. 103), if ¼(M) is superadditive, that is:
¼(f1;2g) ¸ ¼(f1g) + ¼(f2g); (30)
then L = 0. In that case, symmetry in ¯rms' gross pro¯t functions, and the fact that the
laboratory maximizes aggregate bene¯ts ¤(x) in (x) (Proposition 1), imply that a ¯rm's pro¯ts
in the delegated game are:
¼d = ¤=2: (31)
The remainder of the proof identi¯es values of ± which are such that ¼(M) is either strictly subadditive
or superadditive. To that e®ect we solve for values of ± such that (30) holds with equality, to obtain
a frontier which we denote by ±L=0. However, the free maximization of ¼(M); for M = fig, i = 1;2,
may yield negative maximands. Therefore, we consider in turn the free-maximum and constrained-
maximum versions of (27), denoted by · ¼(fig) and ^ ¼(fig), respectively. We thus obtain two frontiers
· ±L=0 (free-maximum) and ^ ±L=0 (constrained-maximum) each of which verify (30) with equality. We
then calculate the values of ± for which the free maximand · xj is equal to the constrained variable
^ xj ´ 0, and denote it by ±· xj=^ xj=0. Finally, we compare ^ ±L=0 and · ±L=0 with ±· xj=^ xj=0 to verify for
which parameter values (i) · ±L=0 veri¯es the positive maximand constraint, and (ii) ^ ±L=0 veri¯es the
non-positive maximand constraint. This allows us to derive the frontier ±L=0 by \pasting" those two
functions.
30C.2.1 Free and Constrained Solutions
² Firstly, we solve the free-maximum version of (27), with M = fig, i = 1;2. De¯ne the following:




¡ 2((2¯ ¡ µ)
2 + (2 ¡ µ¯)











¡ 2(2¯ ¡ µ)
2 :
We assume ¡5; ¡6; and ¡7 are positive for the following free-maximum problem to be concave:
· ¼(fig) = max
x (¼i(x) ¡ s(x)); (32)
where s(x) is given by (13) and ¼i(x) by (17). Maximizing the right-hand side of (32) gives the following
unconstrained R&D solutions:
· xi = 2®(2 ¡ µ)[± (µ ¡ 2¯) + ° (µ¯ ¡ 2)]=¡5; (33)
· xj = 2®(2 ¡ µ)[± (µ¯ ¡ 2) + ° (µ ¡ 2¯)]=¡5: (34)
Making use of (33) and (34) into (32) we obtain, for i = 1;2:






² Secondly, we solve the constrained-maximum versions of (27), with M = fig, i = 1;2. In this simpler
problem, the only concavity condition imposes that ¡6 > 0 to compute:
^ ¼(fig) = max
xi
(¼i(xi;0) ¡ r(xi)); (36)
31where r(xi) is given by (4), and ¼i(xi;0) is obtained by setting xj = ^ xj ´ 0 in (17). Maximizing the
right-hand side of (36) gives the constrained R&D:
^ xi = 2(a ¡ c)(µ¯ ¡ 2)(µ ¡ 2)=¡6: (37)
Substituting (37) into the right-hand side of (36) gives:
^ ¼(fig) = °®2(2 ¡ µ)2=¡7; (38)
for i = 1;2:









° (2¯ ¡ µ)
µ¯ ¡ 2
´ ±· xj=^ xj=0: (39)
C.2.2 The Laboratory's Zero-Bene¯ts Free-maximum Frontier
We evaluate (30), assuming it holds with equality with free-maximum pro¯ts to obtain:
¼(f1;2g) ¡ · ¼(f1g) ¡ · ¼(f2g) = 0; (40)
where · ¼(f1g) and · ¼(f2g) are given by (35). There are two roots to (40). The ¯rst is ± = °, which
however violates (32). The second root is:
± =
2° (2 ¡ µ¯)(µ ¡ 2¯)
(2 ¡ µ¯)
2 + (2¯ ¡ µ)
2 ´ · ±L=0: (41)
To check that (41) is compatible with free maximands, recall from (39) that (41) is de¯ned only if
· ±L=0 ¸ ±· xj=^ xj=0. We form the di®erence:
±· xj=^ xj=0 ¡ · ±L=0; (42)
32and look for parameter values for which it is non-positive. Equating (42) to 0, we ¯nd that ¯ = µ=2
and ¯ = 1 are the only admissible roots (the other roots are ° = 0, µ = §2, and ¯ = ¡1.) Hence, (42)
changes sign once in the domain of ¯: Evaluating (42) at some parameter values, say (¯;°;µ) = (0;1;1),
we obtain ¡3=10. It follows that · ±L=0 is de¯ned only for 0 · ¯ · µ=2.
Finally, using (41), note that the frontier · ±L=0 includes (¯;±) = (µ=2;0).
C.2.3 The Laboratory's Zero-Bene¯ts Constrained-maximum Frontier
As in C.2.2, we evaluate (30), assuming it holds with equality but using the constrained pro¯ts (38),








2 ´ ^ ±L=0: (43)
To check that the latter expression is compatible with a constrained maximand, recall from (39) that
(43) is de¯ned only if ^ ±L=0 · ±· xj=^ xj=0. Then form the di®erence:
±· xj=^ xj=0 ¡ ^ ±L=0; (44)
and look for the parameter values for which it is non-negative. Equating (44) to 0 gives ¯ = µ=2 as the
only admissible root, and three non-admissible roots (° = 0, µ = 2, and ¯ = ¡1). Hence, (44) changes
sign once over the domain of ¯: Evaluating (43) at some parameter values, say (¯;µ;°) = (0;1;1), gives
¡1=4. It follows that (44) is de¯ned only for µ=2 · ¯ · 1.
Finally, using (43), note that, as for · ±L=0, the frontier ^ ±L=0 includes (¯;±) = (µ=2;0).
33C.2.4 The Laboratory's Zero-Bene¯ts Frontier
By taking the conclusions of sections C.2.2 and C.2.3 together, we obtain that (30) holds with equality
if and only if:
± = ±L=0 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
· ±L=0 for 0 · ¯ · µ=2;
^ ±L=0 for µ=2 · ¯ · 1;
(45)
where · ±L=0 and ^ ±L=0 are explicitly given by (41) and (43). Note that ¯ = µ=2 implies ±L=0 = · ±L=0 =
^ ±L=0 = 0. We now prove that ±L=0 is decreasing in ¯, by considering · ±L=0 and ^ ±L=0 in turn.
(· ±L=0) Di®erentiating (41) with respect to ¯ and equating to 0 yields 5 roots (° = 0, µ = §2, or ¯ = §1),
none of which is admissible. It follows that · ±L=0 is strictly monotone over the domain of ¯ on
which · ±L=0 is de¯ned, that is [0;µ=2]. To complete the proof, let for instance ¯ = µ=2, and check
that d· ±L=0=d¯ < 0, as required.
(^ ±L=0) Di®erentiating (43) with respect to ¯ and equating to 0 yields 4 roots (° = 0, µ = §2, or ¯ = ¡1),
none of which is admissible. It follows that ^ ±L=0 is strictly monotone over the domain of ¯ on
which ^ ±L=0 is de¯ned, that is [µ=2;1]. To complete the proof, let, for instance ¯ = 1, and check
that d^ ±L=0=d¯ < 0, as required.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Firstly, if ¯ = µ=2, for all ±, concentrated pro¯ts ¼i(x) depend only on each ¯rm i's own R&D variable
xi (Property 1), in which case the cooperative and non-cooperative games coincide. Secondly, if ± = 0,
for all ¯, we have r(x1) + r(x2) = s(x) (Property 2), and solving the cooperative game is equivalent
to solving the delegated game (Proposition 1). Thirdly, if ¯ = µ=2 and ± = 0, the laboratory earns
no bene¯ts (Proposition 2). By considering all three cases together, we conclude that the cooperative,
non-cooperative, and delegated R&D games yield identical outcomes at the non-externalities point
(µ=2;0).
34D Proof of Lemmas
We ¯rst establish how indirect externalities impact optimal outcomes in the delegated R&D game.
This will be useful for the proofs of Lemmas 1 ¡ 3, which follow.
Lemma D-1 (R&D) dxd=d± > 0:
Di®erentiating (24) with respect to ± gives:
dxd
d±
= 2®b(1 + ¯)(2 + µ)
2=¡2
3: (46)
The result follows from noting that the denominator of (46) is positive because of the concavity con-
dition (18), and the numerator is also positive.
Lemma D-2 (Pro¯ts) d¼d=d± > 0:
We consider ± > ±L=0 and ± · ±L=0 in turn.
(± ¸ ±L=0) By Propositions 1 and 2:
¼d = ¤=2: (47)
Recalling that the laboratory's cost are given by (13), aggregate bene¯ts by (14), and using the












which is unambiguously positive given that xd > 0.










35and look for a contradiction. To do that, recall from Proposition 1 that the laboratory maximizes









Moreover, recalling that the laboratory's cost are given by (13) and aggregate bene¯ts by (14),
by using the envelope theorem we obtain d¤=d± = (xd)2, which is unambiguously positive given
















by transitivity. Inequality (52) contradicts the result that ¼d · ¤=2 for all ± · ±L=0, as established
by Propositions 1 and 2. Hence d¼d=d± > 0.
Lemma D-3 (Welfare) dwd=d± > 0:
Welfare is de¯ned as the sum of ¯rms' pro¯ts and consumer surplus. It has been established above
that pro¯ts ¼d are increasing in ±. Here we turn to consumer surplus by investigating how qi(xd) and
pi(xd) vary with ±.
(qi(xd)) Di®erentiating the Cournot-Nash symmetric equilibrium output (16) evaluated at xd = (xd;xd),




(2 + µ)(1 + ¯)xd
¡3
: (53)
As the denominator of (53) is positive because of (18), and all other parameters of the model as
well as xd are positive, it follows that (53) is also positive.
36(pi(xd)) Di®erentiating the inverse demand function (1) evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium xd =




b(1 + µ)(2 + µ)(1 + ¯)xd
¡3
: (54)
As the denominator of (54) is positive because of (18), it follows that (54) is negative.
Taking (53) and (54) together means that the consumer surplus is increasing in ±. The fact that ¯rms'
pro¯ts are also increasing in ± (Lemma D-2) completes the proof.
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
D.1.1 Equal Delegated and Cooperative R&D Frontier ±xd=xc
As xd is monotone increasing in ± (Lemma D-1) and xc is invariant with ±, it follows that if there exists
a value of ± for which xd = xc, it is unique. Moreover, for ± = 0, (i) the costs of R&D are the same for
the laboratory in the delegated R&D and for both ¯rms in the cooperative game (see Property 2), and
(ii) solving the delegated game for xd is equivalent to solving the cooperative game for xc (because of
Proposition 1). Hence, xd = xc for ± = 0: Making use of that result, Lemma D-1, that xc does not
vary with ± and Proposition 2 gives Lemma 1-(i):
D.1.2 Equal Delegated and Non-Cooperative R&D Frontier ±xd=xn
Using (22) and (24) we de¯ne:
¢(±) ´ xd ¡ xn: (55)
(¯ = µ=2)
Proposition 3 establishes that ¢(0) = 0:
(¯ < µ=2)
37Claim A: ¢(±) < 0. Section D.1.1 establishes that xd = xc for ± = 0. Next, we know from
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) that xc < xn for ¯ 2 [0;µ=2) and all values of ±. Claim A
follows by transitivity.
Claim B: ¢(±) > 0 along ±L=0. Recall from (45) that ±L=0 = · ±L=0 > 0 for ¯ < µ=2. Then
evaluating (55) at ± = · ±L=0; and equating to 0 gives 7 roots (° = 0;µ = §2;® = 0;¯ = µ=2;¯ =
1;b = 0:), none of which is admissible. Therefore, ¢(· ±L=0) does not change sign over this range
of ¯. It is straightforward to check that claim B holds by computing ¢(· ±L=0) at, say, ¯ = 0 and
any admissible values for the other parameters, and obtaining a positive value.
(¯ > µ=2)
Claim C: ¢(±) > 0 for ± = 0. Recall that xd = xc for ± = 0, as established in Section D.1.1.
Then note that xc > xn for ¯ 2 (µ=2;1] from d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), all ±. Claim C
follows by transitivity.
Claim D: ¢(±) < 0 along ±L=0. Recall from (45) that ±L=0 = ^ ±L=0 < 0 for ¯ > µ=2; evaluate (55)
at ± = ^ ±L=0; and equating to 0 gives 7 roots (° = 0;µ = §2;® = 0;¯ = µ=2;¯ = 2=µ;b = 0:),
none of which is admissible. Therefore, ¢(^ ±L=0) does not change sign over the relevant range of
¯. It is straightforward to check that ¢(^ ±L=0) is negative by evaluating it at, say, ¯ = 1 and any
value for other parameters. Hence claim D is true.
Recall how ±L=0 is constructed in (45). Using claims A to D, that xd is continuous and monotone
increasing in ± (Lemma D-1) while xn does not vary with ±, means there exists a unique ± ´ ±xd=xn
such that xd >
=
<




±xd=xn, with ±xd=xn as in Lemma 1-(ii).
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
D.2.1 Equal Delegated and Cooperative Pro¯ts Frontier ±¼d=¼c
(¯ = µ=2)
38We know from Proposition 3 that ¼d = ¼c for ± = 0 (the no-externalities case).
Now we consider ¯ < µ=2, for which ±L=0 > 0, and ¯ > µ=2, for which ±L=0 < 0:
(¯ < µ=2)





because the laboratory appropriates a share of maximized aggregate bene¯ts as L > 0 for ± =





from the speci¯cation of the cooperative R&D game. Putting (56) and (57) together gives ¼d < ¼c
for ± = 0.





from Propositions 1 and 2 because ¯rms earn all maximized aggregate bene¯ts as L = 0 for





because of (57) and ¤j±=0 < ¤j±=±L=0 as a result of (48). Putting (58) and (59) together means
claim B holds.
(¯ > µ=2)










from the speci¯cation of the cooperative R&D game. Claim C follows from (60) and (61).
Claim D: ±L=0 < 0 for ¯ > µ=2: That claim follows directly from Proposition 2.
Given claims A to D, that ¼d is continuous and monotone increasing in ± (Lemma D-2) means
there exists a unique ± ´ ±¼d=¼c such that ¼d >
=
<




±¼d=¼c, with ±¼d=¼c as
in Lemma 2-(i).
D.2.2 Equal Delegated and Non-Cooperative Pro¯ts Frontier ±¼d=¼n
(¯ = µ=2)
We know from Proposition 3 that ¼d = ¼n for ± = 0.
Now we consider ¯ < µ=2, for which ±L=0 > 0, and ¯ > µ=2, for which ±L=0 < 0. In both cases, we
make use of ±xd=xn as de¯ned in Lemma 1. Note that ±xd=xn is identical to ±· xj=^ xj=0, for all ¯. Indeed,





which is the same as (39). The other non-admissible roots to xd¡xn = 0 are ® = 0, µ = ¡2, and b = 0:
(¯ < µ=2)
Claim A: ¼d < ¼n for ± = ±xd=xn. To prove claim A note that as ± = ±· xj=^ xj=0 = ±xd=xn; it
follows that ¼d = ¤¡¼(fig) from Proposition 2,14 with ¼(fig) = · ¼(fig) = ^ ¼(fig) because of the
de¯nition of ±· xj=^ xj=0. Using the latter and (23) we de¯ne:
~ ¢(±) = ¼d ¡ ¼n: (62)
40As the roots to ~ ¢(±xd=xn) = 0 (° = 0;® = 0;¯ = µ=2;¯ = 2=µ) are not admissible, ~ ¢(±xd=xn)
does not change sign. It su±ces to evaluate (62) at, say, ¯ = 0, to check that claim A is valid.
Claim B: ¼d > ¼n for ± = ±¼d=¼c. We know that ¼d = ¼c along ±¼d=¼c by de¯nition, while ¼c > ¼n
for ¯ < µ=2 and any ± from d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Therefore, by transitivity claim
B is true.
(¯ > µ=2)
Claim C: ¼d < ¼n for ± = ±xd=xn. Recall from (2) that the unit costs of production are equal under
delegated and non-cooperative R&D along ±xd=xn. Thus, from (1) and (16), qi(xd) = qi(xn) and
pi(xd) = pi(xn), for i = 1;2; along ±xd=xn. It follows that gross concentrated pro¯ts (i.e., before
R&D costs) are also equal, that is:
¼i(xd) = ¼i(xn); (63)
i = 1;2. Moreover, we know from Lemma 1-(ii) that ±L=0 < ±xd=xn < 0. The ¯rst inequality
sign means that the laboratory exactly breaks even along ±xd=xn because of Proposition 2. This
implies that ¯rms' symmetric transfer payments exactly cover the laboratory's costs, that is
td
1(xd) + td
2(xd) = s(xd): The second inequality means indirect externalities are negative along
±xd=xn; because of Property 2. This implies that the laboratory's R&D costs are strictly greater




2 = xn. It follows
that td
i (xd) > r(xn
i ) along ±xd=xn: It su±ces to use (63) to obtain:
¼i(xd) ¡ td
i (xd) < ¼i(xn) ¡ r(xn
i ); (64)
i = 1;2. Inequality (64) says that claim C, which refers to net pro¯ts, is true.
Claim D: ¼d > ¼n for ± = 0. In the absence of indirect externalities, we have s(x) = r(x1)+r(x2).
In that case, from Proposition 1, we know that solving the delegated game for xd is equivalent
to solving the cooperative game for xc. Then, from Proposition 2, because ± = 0 > ±L=0 implies
41that the laboratory exactly breaks even, we have ¼d = ¼c. As ¼c is always greater than ¼n, from
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), claim D follows by transitivity.
Given claims A to D, that ¼d is continuous and monotone increasing in ± from Lemma D-2, and ¼n is
invariant with ±, means there exists a unique ± ´ ±¼d=¼n such that ¼d >
=
<





with ±¼d=¼n as in Lemma 2-(ii).
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
D.3.1 Equal Delegated and Cooperative Welfare Frontier ±wd=wc
As wd is monotone increasing in ± (Lemma D-3), and wc does not vary with ±, it follows that if
there exists a value of ± such that wd = wc, it is unique. Moreover, for ± = 0, we know (i) the
laboratory's costs in the delegated game are equal to both ¯rms' total R&D costs in the cooperative
game (Property 2), and (ii) solving the delegated game for xd is equivalent to solving the delegated
game for xc (Proposition 1). Hence, the two games yield the same equilibrium quantities and prices,
that is qi(xd) = qi(xc) and pi(xd) = pi(xc), i = 1;2. Recalling that wd is continuous and monotone
increasing in ±, whereas wc is invariant with ±, gives Lemma 3-(i).
D.3.2 Equal Delegated and Non-Cooperative Welfare Frontier ±wd=wn
(¯ = µ=2)
We know from Proposition 3 that wd = wn for ± = 0.
Now we turn to other the values of ¯.
i) We compare consumer surpluses and gross concentrated pro¯ts (i.e., before R&D costs), in the
delegated and non-cooperative games along ±xd=xn, and show they are the same. To see that, recall
that xd = xn along ±xd=xn, by de¯nition. Therefore production costs, together with quantities
42and thus prices, are identical in the two games, that is ci(xd) = ci(xn), qi(xd) = qi(xn), and
pi(xd) = pi(xn), i = 1;2. It follows that ¯rms' gross pro¯ts and consumer surpluses are the same
in the delegated and non-cooperative R&D games along ±xd=xn.
ii) We show that the sign of the di®erence between total R&D costs in the delegated and non-




























for all x1;x2 > 0. Hence, (65) means that along ±xd=xn, the laboratory's costs are less than (equal
to, greater than) ¯rms' total in-house R&D costs if and only if ¯ is less than (equal to, greater
than) µ=2.














We now use (66) to establish the existence of ±wd=wn for ¯ < µ=2, and ¯ > µ=2 respectively.
(¯ < µ=2)
Claim A: wd > wn along ±xd=xn. This claim follows from (66). Moreover ±xd=xn < ±¼d=¼n from
Lemma 2-(ii), for ¯ < µ=2.
Claim B: wd < wn for ± = 0. Recall that wc = wd for ± = 0 by Proposition 1, and wc < wn for
¯ < µ=2 from d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Claim B follows by transitivity.
(¯ > µ=2)
Claim C: wd < wn along ±xd=xn, for ¯ > µ=2. The proof of claim C follows directly from (66).
43Claim D: wd > wn for ± = ±¼d=¼n. On the ¯rms' side, ¼d = ¼n on ±¼d=¼n by de¯nition. On
the consumers' side, because ±¼d=¼n > ±xd=xn from Lemma 2-(ii), we obtain xd > xn, and
consequently ci(xd) < ci(xn) leads to qi(xd) > qi(xn) and pi(xd) < pi(xn), i = 1;2, on ±¼d=¼n.
On the laboratory's side, we know that ±¼d=¼n > ±L=0 from Lemma 2-(ii) in the case of positive
direct externalities, which implies that L = 0 from Proposition 2. As ¯rms and consumers are
better-o® in the delegated R&D game than in the non-cooperative one, while the laboratory earns
zero bene¯ts in either game, means that claim D is true.
Using claims A to D, that wd is continuous and monotone increasing in ± (Lemma D-3), while
wn does not vary with ±, means there exists a unique ± ´ ±wd=wn such that wd >
=
<





±wd=wn, with ±wd=wn as in Lemma 3-(ii).
44All four ﬁgures are drawn for a =1 ,b =1 ,c =3 /4,γ =2 ,θ = 1. Figures 1, 2, 3
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Figure 1: (R&D outcomes): xd >
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Figure 3: (Social welfare): wd >
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Figure 4: (Delegation dominance): the shaded area represents the set of points (β,δ)
for which the delegated R&D game is a Pareto optimal organizational form of R&D, and
the laboratory earns positive beneﬁts.
48Notes
1These numbers refer to industrial R&D performed outside a company's facilities and funded from all sources except
the Federal Government. For details and distributions by industry and by size of company, see NSF (2003, Table A-10,
pp. 46-47).
2Dobler and Burt (1996) observe that \R&D services normally are purchased through one of the two methods of
compensation: a ¯xed price for a level of e®ort (e.g., ¯fty days) or a cost plus ¯xed or award fee" (p. 416).
3For details on these contracts, and other examples, see: www.recap.com/bday.nsf.
4For example, Kamien, Tauman and Zang (1988) examine the case of a superior product which is licensed to producers
of an inferior substitute through a ¯xed fee. Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992b) compare alternative licensing strategies,
namely a ¯xed fee, a per unit royalty, and the auctioning of a ¯xed number of licenses.
5For instance, Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992a) consider spillovers on the input side of the R&D stage, Suzu-
mura (1992) introduces a second-best welfare criterion, Motta (1992) and Rosenkranz (1995) consider quality-improving
R&D, Vonortas (1994) distinguishes between generic research and commercial development, Poyago-Theotoky (1999)
and Kamien and Zang (2000) endogeneize spillovers, and Hinloopen (2000) introduces Bertrand competition on the ¯nal
market with more than two ¯rms.
6See Martin (2001) for a critical overview of that literature.
7The business literature (Howells, James and Malik 2003, for example) opposes the outsourcing of new technological
knowledge, under conditions stipulated in a contract agreed beforehand, to ¯rms licensing existing technological knowledge.
8This terminology is similar to what La®ont and Martimort (1997) call \type 1" (indirect) and \type 2" (direct)
externalities.
9Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (2001) di®er fundamentally in their theoretical use of the non-
deterministic R&D assumption. While Aghion and Tirole (1994) emphasize the non-contractibility of the uncertain R&D
outcome, Ambec and Poitevin (2001) stress an informational problem as attached to the risky nature of R&D tasks.
10The proofs of the existence and stability properties, that characterize truthful Nash equilibria for a class of common
agency games which include the present speci¯cation, are in Bernheim and Whinston (1986).




i, in the cooperative and non-cooperative in-house R&D games. In this case, Amir
(2000) demonstrates that d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), in which x is a vector of R&D outcomes, and Kamien et al.
(1992a), in which x describes R&D investments, yield the same e®ective cost-reducing outcomes. We let the laboratory's







12A ¯rst step towards the generalization of the delegated R&D model to more than two ¯rms is easily obtained by
applying two recent results by Billete de Villemeur and Versaevel (2003). They establish su±cient conditions for ¼(M),
as de¯ned in (27), with M 2 2
N and #N ¸ 2, to be either strictly subadditive or convex (and thus for the laboratory to
earn positive bene¯ts or to exactly break even, respectively). However, ¼(M) should be strongly subbadditive to obtain
¼
d = ¤¡¼(Nnfig), for all i, in all TSPNE. The strong subadditivity property (see Laussel and Le Breton (2001, p. 104)
for a formal de¯nition) is stronger than the strict additivity property used in this paper. The two properties coincide for
#N = 2 only.
13The conjecture that an agent in charge of R&D activities may have no superior information about project returns
before acting dates back from Holmstrom (1989), who sees it as a "reasonable assumption if we are at the initial stages of
a research undertaking" (p. 310). Interestingly, this falls in line with the speci¯cations of a theoretical paper on common
agency by Laussel and Le Breton (1998), who introduce a random parameter in the agent's cost function which is not
realized at the contracting stage. In this setting, the laboratory's cost would become ¹s(x), where ¹ is a positive random
variable. The laboratory would not know the realization of ¹ before accepting or refusing the ¯rms' contracts (that is,
strategies ti(x) in our notation, i = 1;2), but would learn it before producing R&D services (that is, x).
14Lemma 1-(ii) implies that ±· xj=^ xj=0 = ±xd=xn < ±L=0.
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